North Dakota Law Review
Volume 71

Number 2

Article 4

1995

Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and
Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources
Judith V. Royster

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Royster, Judith V. (1995) "Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of
Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 71 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol71/iss2/4

This Proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

EQUIVOCAL OBLIGATIONS: THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL TRUST
RELATIONSHIP AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES
JUDITH

V.

ROYSTER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

328

II.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FEDERAL TRUST ..................
.............. 329

...................

III. TRIBAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
A.

MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

B.

... .............. 334

FEDERAL TRUST OBLIGATIONS IN

............

.............. 334

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN

MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

............

.............. 338

IV. THE FEDERAL TRUST AND CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST .......................
A. OFF-RESERVATION FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT
B.

V.

WATER RESOURCES CONFLICTS

342
343
348

.........

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN TRIBAL MINERAL
DEVELOPMENT ..................................

VI. CONCLUSION .............................

* Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law.

358
.....

363

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

I.

[VOL. 71:327

INTRODUCTION

Administrative conflicts of interest have plagued tribes in the development of their resources and the protection of their environment. The
federal government, charged with a trust responsibility toward the Indian
tribes, is also charged with representing the national interest in the public
lands and resources. Where the interests of the tribes and the interests of
the public conflict, the federal government is faced with resolving
competing claims to resource use and environmental protection.
One of the situations in which the federal conflict of interest may
become acute is the development of tribal mineral resources. On the one
hand, the Secretary of the Interior is obligated by Congress to determine
whether the development of tribal minerals is in the best interests of the
tribal owner. On the other hand, the Secretary also represents constituent
bureaus such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which may
object to tribal mineral development because of the environmental
consequences to public lands.l The Secretary's resolution of those
competing interests raises important issues of administrative conflicts and
the federal trust obligation to the Indian tribes.
Much of the law of conflicts of interest between tribal concerns and
national values has developed in two contexts: proposed development of
federal resources outside Indian country that will have adverse impacts
on tribes, and management of water resources shared by tribes and
federal projects. The conflicts doctrine developed in these cases has
generally permitted the federal government to subordinate tribal interests
to public interests, based on the lack of a full fiduciary relationship
obligating the government to act in the interests of the affected tribes.
In the case of tribal mineral development, however, the Secretary of
the Interior is operating under statutes that require full fiduciary
1. Public lands are defined statutorily as all lands and interests in lands owned by the United
States and managed by the BLM, not including "land held for the benefit of Indians." 43 U.S.C. §
1702(e)(2) (1988); see also Maria E. Mansfield, A Primeron Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801,
832 (1993).
The conflict would be most apparent in the case of split-estate lands, where the mineral estate
was held in trust for the tribe and the surface estate was public land. While multiple split-estate
situations exist in Indian country, none appears to involve that particular combination. See MARJANE
AMBLER, BRE-AKIN THE IRON BONDs: INDIAN COmROL OF ENERGY D EVELOPMENT 47 (1990) (listing nine
split estate situations existing today). There is, however, at least one instance in which the federal
government owns the surface lands over a tribal mineral estate. The Cheyenne River Act of 1954
transferred more than 100,000 acres of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation to the United States for
the Oahe Darn and Reservoir, reserving all "mineral rights" to the tribe and its members. See South
Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2314 (1993). The federal lands in that case appear to be
managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, although the Court noted that the exact nature of the
government's title was uncertain. Id. at 2314 n.4.
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attention to tribal interests. In deciding whether to proceed with
proposed development of tribal mineral resources, the Secretary is
expressly obligated to act in the best interests of the tribe. And in
determining whether a proposed agreement is in the best interests of the
tribe, the Secretary is mandated to consider environmental concerns.
The Secretary must take account of the impacts on the affected
environment, and must determine that the proposed benefits of mineral
development outweigh the environmental consequences for the tribe,
before the Secretary may determine that mineral development is in the
best interests of the tribe.
Where the Secretary, acting as a fiduciary, determines that mineral
development is in the best interests of the tribe, particularly given that the
determination requires both procedural and substantive consideration of
environmental values, that decision should not be subject to competing
federal claims. Balancing the tribal interest against public considerations,
and in particular subordinating the tribal interest to public interests
represented by agencies such as the BLM, violates the Secretary's trust
obligations to the Indian tribes.
II.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRUST

The federal trust relationship with the Indian tribes is complex and
mutable. Its American legal origins are most commonly traced to the
Cherokee Cases of the 1830s. 2 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia3 Chief
Justice John Marshall first articulated the guardian-ward comparison and
developed the now-famous designation of Indian tribes as "domestic
dependent nations" which had acknowledged themselves to be under the

2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832). See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (Rennard Strickland, ed.
1982); Reid Peyton Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalTrust Responsibility to Indians, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1215-18 (1975); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of
Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1001 (1981)
[hereinafter Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country]; Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal
Indian Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 422, 423 (1984) [hereinafter Rethinking the Trust Doctrine];John W.
Ragsdale, Jr., Indian Reservations and the Preservationof Tribal Culture: Beyond Wardship to
Stewardship, 59 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 503,509 (1991).
The origins of Marshall's concept are themselves uncertain. Professor Collins posits that the
Marshall Court "was heir to" the traditions of the English Court of Chancery and the equitable concept
of holding those in power to fiduciary standards as the means to prevent or control abuse of power.
Richard B. Collins, Origins and Dimensions of the Trust Relationship Between the Indian Nations and
the United States, 1991 ABA SONREEL Third Annual Conf. on Natural Res. Dev. on Indian Lands
7-1, 7-13 to 7-15 (1991). Professor Clinton notes the practical origins in the colonial appointment of
trustees for conquered tribes. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest
for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 129-30 (1993) [hereinafter Clinton,
Redressing Conquest].
3. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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protection of the United States. 4 That protectorate status, Marshall
subsequently explained, meant only that the tribes had allied with the
United States and received the protection of a more powerful sovereign;
nothing in that status affected the "national character" of the tribes
themselves.5 Instead, the tribes remained separate peoples with inherent
and federally-protected rights of self-government, rights that barred state
authority within Indian territory.6
Marshall's guardianship theory was grounded in a general duty of
the United States, as the more powerful sovereign, to protect tribal lands
and the right of self-government within tribal territories.7 Over the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the theory evolved from the
Marshallian ideal of protection to a justification for the exercise of
federal power.8 During the judicial plenary power era, roughly
coterminous with the legislative allotment policy, 9 the Court authorized
congressional expropriation of tribal governmental authority and tribal
lands on the theory that Indians needed the "care and protection" of
the federal government. 10 If, in the exercise of that protectorate power,
the federal government chose to subject Indians to federal criminal
laws"' or to take tribal lands for homesteaders in violation of express
treaty provisions,1 2 the Court would not intervene. Instead, given the
4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Marshall rejected the Cherokee
Nation's argument that it was a foreign nation for purposes of federal jurisdiction. "They may, more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations .... Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id.
5. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552, 555.
6. Id. at 559-61.
7. Chambers, supra note 2, at 1219-20; Collins, supranote 2, at 7-17.
8. Professor Ball argues that: "The likely origin of the trust doctrine is not Marshall's notion of
wardship but the later ethnocentrism that also produced the notions of superiority and unrestrained
power." Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 A.BF. REs. J. 1,63 (1987).
9. The allotment era was formally ushered in by the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24
Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)), and formally terminated by
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in part at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (1988)). The judicial plenary power era reached its height as well from the 1870s
to the 1930s. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195,207 (1984).
10. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903); see also United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
11. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383. In Kagama, the Court upheld congressional power to impose
the Major Crimes Act on tribes. Id. The Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988),
provided for federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes committed by Indians within Indian country,
effectively abrogating tribal control over the conduct of tribal citizens.
12. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554-60. In Lone Wolf, the Court held that Congress could
unilaterally abrogate a treaty with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes that required the
signatures of three-fourths of the adult males for cessions of reservation lands. Id. at 564. Congress
took the lands by statute for allotment and sale to homesteaders without the required signatures. Id.
The Court determined that, in the exercise of its plenary power for the care of the Indians, Congress
could not be limited by treaty promises, but must be free to act as it saw fit. Id.
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dependent status of the tribes, the Court would "presume" that Congress
had "a moral obligation ... to act in good faith" in legislating over the
tribes.13 Whether Congress in fact complied with its obligation was a
political question.14
Over the course of the twentieth century, the symbiotic relationship
between the guardianship principles and federal plenary power
underwent a second significant change. At the turn of the century, the
guardian-ward relationship, the necessity for Congress to act for the
protection of the tribes, was asserted as both the source and the
justification of plenary power. But seventy-five years later, the trust
relationship was asserted as a source of enforceable rights and duties
placed on the agencies charged with implementing congressional
policy.1 5 As one indicator of this change, the Court repudiated many of
the most destructive aspects of the plenary power doctrine. The Court
ceased to write in overtly ethnocentric terms, and held that Congress'
exercise of its power is at least subject to review under constitutional
mandates.16 By 1980, the Court had expressly rejected the doctrine of
the plenary power era that congressional action toward tribes was a
political question, escaping judicial review. 17 The other primary measure
of the twentieth century change was the evolution of a
legally-enforceable federal trust obligation to the tribes. 18 With the
explosive growth of Indian rights litigation in the late 1960s and 1970s
came the judicial development of a cause of action for breach of trust. 19
13. Id. at 566.
14. Id. at 568 (noting that "as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation").
15. See Newton, supra note 9, at 231-33. Because it is not constitutionally based, the trust
doctrine cannot be asserted to prevent or remedy congressional action, d. at 231. Instead, federal
trust obligations are enforceable against the executive branch. Id. at 232-33.
16. Congressional action may, for example, be reviewed under various provisions of the Fifth
Amendment. See, eg., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (takings clause); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (equal protection clause). See generally Newton, supra note 9, at
236-86.
17. Sioux Nation,448 US. at 14-15 (noting that "Lone Wols presumption of congressional good
faith has little to commend it as an enduring principle for deciding questions of the kind presented
here").
18. Professor Newton has recently explored the extent to which breach of trust claims are
legally enforceable in fact. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,41 AM.
U. L. REy. 753, 784-817 (1992); see also Steven Paul McSloy, Revisiting the Courts of the Conqueror:
American Indian Law Cases in the FederalCircuit and the Courtof FederalClaims, 1991-1993,43 AM.
U. L. REV. 537,589-608 (1994).
19. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942). The Seminole Nation was awarded
relief for breach of trust in a case which may mark the transition from the plenary power era view of
the federal trust obligation to the modern approach. The Court spoke grandly of the "distinctive
obligation of trust," id. at 296, and held the federal government to "the most exacting fiduciary
standards." Id. at 297. Nonetheless, the Seminole Nation litigation was brought pursuant to a special
jurisdictional act of Congress. Id. at 289. Not until the 1970s did the federal courts recognize a
general action for breach of the federal trust obligation to tribes. See Chambers, supra note 2, at 1247
(noting in 1975 that it was still "premature" to state definitively that tribes had a recognized cause of
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The Supreme Court defined the parameters of the breach of trust
action in the Mitchell cases Of the early 1980s.20 In Mitchell I, the Court
held that the General Allotment Act created only a "limited trust
relationship" and therefore did not support an action for breach of trust
for alleged federal mismanagement of allottees' timber resources. 2 1 By
contrast, the Court held three years later in Mitchell II, the federal
statutory and regulatory scheme for timber management did support an
action for damages for breach of trust. 2 2 Unlike the "bare trust" of the
General Allotment Act, the timber statutes and regulations placed
comprehensive responsibilities on the federal government to manage the
timber resources in the best interests of the Indians. 23 The federal
government's "elaborate control" over Indian lands and resources,
"reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship,"
the Court held, decreed that the United States should be liable in
damages for breach of its fiduciary obligations under the timber
management scheme.24
Functionally, then, the Mitchell cases developed a tripartite approach
25
to the federal government's trust relationship with the Indian tribes.
26
First, the federal government has a "general trust" relationship,
derived in all likelihood from Marshall's guardianship approach.
Although the general trust may be little more than a statement that the
2 7 it
government owes general fiduciary obligations to the tribes,
nonetheless represents the historical obligation of the federal
government to protect tribal lands and tribal self-government. In
consequence, the general trust obligation serves as the source of the
restraint on alienation of Indian lands.28 The modern requirement that
the Secretary of the Interior approve leases of Indian lands is an

action for breach of trust). Ball, supra note 8, at 62 ("The trust doctrine is, for the most part, a creation
of the 1970s.").
20. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter Mitchell I]; United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell I1].
21. 445 U.S. at 542.
22. 463 U.S. at 226.
23. Id. at 224.
24. Id. at 225-26.
25. Newton, supra note 18, at 801-02.
26. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 226.
27. Newton, supra note 18, at 801. Professor Newton notes that the general trust relationship
may also provide the rationale for the canons of construction. Id. The canons provide that treaties
and statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians are to be construed, and all ambiguities are to be
resolved, in favor of the tribes. See CoHEs's HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 221-24.
28. Since 1790, congressional consent has been required for the sale or encumbrance of tribal
property, as a means of protecting the tribal land base. See I Stat. 137 (1790). The current version is
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
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outgrowth of that general trust responsibility for the protection of tribal
lands and resources.29
The second type of trust relationship is the "bare" or "limited"
trust, exemplified by the General Allotment Act, and restricted to the
original purpose of the statute that creates it.30 A limited trust may be
remediable, but it does not give rise to fiduciary duties enforceable
generally by actions for damages. Instead, the remedies are restricted to
enforcement of the specific purposes of the limited duties.31 For
example, even in the absence of comprehensive federal control, the
requirement of secretarial approval of leases will create a limited trust
enforceable by an administrative action for cancellation. 32
The third category of trust relationship is the full fiduciary
relationship found in Mitchell H. This full trust relationship arises from
comprehensive federal management of tribal assets, whether that
management is established by comprehensive statutes and regulations or
by actual pervasive federal control. 33 This last type of trust relationship,
the full fiduciary relationship, is the one which gives rise to enforceable
fiduciary duties remediable by actions for damages or other relief for
breach of trust. 34
29. See, e.g., Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988); Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1988). See generally Reid Peyton Chambers &
Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: SecretarialDiscretionand the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1974).
30. Newton, supra note 18. at 801-02. In Mitchell I, the Court referred to the General Allotment
Act as creating "only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does
not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources." 445 U.S. at 542. In Mitchell
II, the Court used the term "bare trust" to distinguish the government's obligations under the General
Allotment Act from the full fiduciary responsibility under the timber management scheme. 463 U.S. at
224.
31. Newton, supra note 18, at 806 (noting that the General Allotment Act should give rise to an
enforceable duty on the part of the government to prevent the forced sale of trust allotments for
nonpayment of taxes).
32. See Wright v. United States, 32 Cl. Ct. 54, 58 (1994) (holding that the regulations governing
surface leasing of allotted lands place only "limited duties" such as lease approval on the government
and therefore create a right only to a "limited remedy" such as the right to challenge the leases
through the administrative process).
33. See Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224-25; see also Newton, supra note 18, at 803-06. In most
instances, a full fiduciary relationship is established by a statutory and/or regulatory scheme. But
occasionally the courts will find a full fiduciary relationship based on the government's assumption of
actual pervasive control. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe of Arizona v. United States, 11 Cl.
Ct. 614, 650 (1987) ("[T]he Government established a program of leasing grazing land under permits
to non-Indian livestock owners. It was under no obligation to do so. But having undertaken to
administer this program, the Government was obligated to act in a fiduciary capacity toward those
lands."), affd without opinion, 5 F.3d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994).
34. Mitchell H, 463 U.S. at 226 ("Given the existence of a [full] trust relationship, it naturally
follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties.");
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1565 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), adopted as modified..782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (action brought in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief, based on the
government's full fiduciary obligations for mineral development). See also Newton, supra note 18, at
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While the trust doctrine has been frequently criticized as
paternalistic and colonialist, its retention today can be justified as a way
to protect tribal territories and tribal rights within those boundaries. 35 To
the extent that the doctrine actually serves to protect tribal lands,
resources, and governmental rights against state and federal intrusion, it
remains useful to the tribes. And to the extent that the doctrine places
enforceable legal duties on the federal government, it is a source of
valuable rights. Nonetheless, although the trust doctrine "ought to mean
something real and be enforced with teeth," 3 6 it too often does not and
is not. The modem trust obligation does not limit what Congress may
do,37 and tribes have been "remarkably unsuccessful" in pursuing legal
actions for breach of trust. 3 8 Despite those substantial drawbacks,
however, the trust doctrine remains one of the few constraints on
unfettered federal power over the Indian tribes.
III. TRIBAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT
The particular context here for exploring issues of the federal trust
obligation, environmental concerns, and administrative conflicts of
interest is that of mineral development. And mineral development in
Indian country is governed by extensive statutes and regulations, setting
forth the trusteeship obligations of the federal government and the
environmental compliance requirements for approval of mineral
development projects. These aspects of the federal statutory scheme are
considered below.
A.

FEDERAL TRUST OBLIGATIONS IN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

The federal government has enforceable trust obligations with
regard to the development of tribal mineral resources. The federal
fiduciary responsibility extends to any tribe which owns mineral
resources in trust, and thus applies even to tribes which hold a beneficial

784-86 (discussing breach of trust claims in the federal district courts).
35. See, e.g., Clinton, Redressing Conquest, supra note 2, at 134; Chambers & Price. supra note
29, at 1079-80. But see Robert Laurence, A Memorandum to the Class, 46 ARK. L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1993) (arguing that "in my dream world" tribes would not need the trust doctrine. "A government as
sovereign as I want the tribes to be no longer needs the benefits of the trust responsibility.").
36. Laurence, supra note 35, at 15.
37. See Newton, supra note 9, at 285 (noting that "[wihatever Congress wants, Congress gets");
Ball, supra note 8, at 62, 65.
38. Newton, supra note 18, at 789.
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interest in only the subsurface mineral estate. 39 Tribal mineral resources
may be developed today under either the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
193840 or the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982.41 While the
federal trust obligation with regard to mineral development is well
established for mineral leases under the 1938 Act, its parameters for
mineral agreements under the 1982 Act are less well-defined.4 2
The 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act and its implementing
regulations comprise a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the leasing
of tribal mineral lands, and thus create enforceable fiduciary duties. 43
The Secretary of the Interior is obligated, in approving 1938 Act leases,
to maximize tribal economic returns and to act at all times in the best
interests of the tribes.44 More specifically, the trust duty requires the
Secretary to make all decisions in the leasing process according to the
best interests of the lessor tribes. Courts have held, for example, that in
determining whether to approve a proposed lease 45 or an oil and gas
communitization agreement, 4 6 or in determining the proper method of

39. See 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988) (authorizing any tribe to enter into a development agreement
for mineral resources "in which such tribe owns a beneficial or restricted interest"); 25 C.F.R. §
225.20 (same) and § 225.3 (defining "Indian mineral owner" to include any tribe "that owns a mineral
interest in oil and gas, geothermal resources or solid minerals, title to which is held in trust by the
United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States"). See also
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which defines "Indian lands" as all lands within
reservation boundaries, regardless of ownership, "and all lands including mineral interests held in trust
for or supervised by an Indian tribe." 30 U.S.C. § 1291(9) (1988). This definition includes even
off-reservation lands in which the tribe owns either the surface estate or the mineral resources in fee.
Valencia Energy Co., 96 Interior Dec. 239, 254 (1989), affd, New Mexico ex rel. Energy, Minerals &
Natural Resources Dept. v. Lujan, 21 Indian L. Rep. 3113 (D. N.M. 1994).
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1988).
41. 25 V.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1988).
42. See generally Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of
Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 568-71 (1938 Act), 589-92 (1982 Act)
(1994).
43. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc),
adopting as modified the dissent in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555,
1563-69 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., dissenting) (noting that the federal government's involvement in
mineral leasing "is pervasive and its responsibilities comprehensive"). The 1986 modification of
Judge Seymour's dissent did not affect her discussion or conclusions on the trust issue. See also
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782,794 (9th Cir. 1986);
Youngbull v. United States. No. 31-88 L, 1990 U.S. CI. Ct. LEXIS 3, at *19-*23 (Jan. 4, 1990). Under
the Supron analysis, the mineral leasing statute and regulations create a Mitchell II type of full
fiduciary relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
44. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1565; Youngbull, 1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS at *27. See 25 U.S.C. 88
396a-396b; 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1994). The Secretary's obligations in this regard are made even more
explicit in the proposed new regulations for 1938 Act leases. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,737 (1991)
(proposed at 25 C.F.R. § 2.11 .1(a)); 56 Fed Reg. at 58,739 (proposed at 25 C.F.R. § 211.20(b)(6)).
45. Youngbull, 1990 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS at *27.
46. Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 388 (10th Cir. 1982);
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom., Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
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calculating royalties, 47 the Secretary's decisions are to be predicated
upon the best interests of the tribes.
Although standard mineral leases under the 1938 Act are still
available to tribes, they are little used today. 4 8 Most tribes developing
mineral resources now prefer the flexibility and potentially greater
economic returns of mineral agreements under the Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982.49 And the 1982 Act expressly requires the
Secretary to act "in the best interest of the Indian tribe" in approving or
disapproving a mineral agreement.5 0 Moreover, the implementing
regulations clarify that the fiduciary standard applies whenever the
Secretary considers any administrative action which affects the interests
of the tribe.51 In the decisionmaking process, the Secretary is directed to
consider any relevant factor, including economic considerations and
financial effects, the marketability of the minerals, and the "potential
environmental, social and cultural effects" on the tribe.52
In addition to this general directive to act in a fiduciary capacity, the
1982 Act and its regulations create an integral role for the Secretary in
the development of tribal mineral resources. Before an agreement is
entered into, the Secretary is charged, to the extent of "available
resources," with providing advice, assistance, and information to tribes
that are negotiating mineral agreements.53 The Secretary is also charged
with preparing an economic assessment, including such factors as
assurances of due diligence, adequate royalty provisions, and the
likelihood of returns comparable to those obtainable through
competitive bidding.5 4 Similarly, the Secretary is responsible for
47. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1567, 1569.
48. AMBLER, supra note 1, at 241; M. Julia Hook & Britt D. Banks, The Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1982, 7(4) NAT. REs. & ENV'T 11, 52 (1993).
49. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108. Mineral agreements represent a substantial departure from the
standardized leases of the 1938 Act. Under the 1982 Act, tribes may enter into "any joint venture,
operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement" for the development of
mineral resources. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b).
51. 25 CF.R. § 225.3 (1994) ("In the best interest of the Indian mineral owner refers to the
standards to be applied by the Secretary in considering whether to take administrative action affecting
the interests of an Indian mineral owner.").
52. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b); 25 C.F.R. §§ 225.3, 225.22(c) (1994). These factors, relevant to whether
a proposed mineral agreement is in the best interest of the tribe, are derived from the "all relevant
factors" standard developed in a series of Tenth Circuit cases delineating the trust responsibility under
the 1938 Act. See Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.
1982); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 870 F.2d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1989);
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 966 F.2d 583, 588 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom., Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993);
Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Department of Interior, 18 F.3d 854, 858-59 (10th Cir. 1994).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988); 25 C.F.R. § 225.21(a) (1994).
54. 25 C.F.R. § 225.23 (1994).
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ensuring the preparation of studies and surveys in compliance with
federal environmental laws. 55 Once a mineral agreement is operative, the
Secretary continues to have an important role. The Secretary is
authorized to conduct audits.56 All payments pursuant to a mineral
agreement are made to the Secretary unless otherwise designated. 57 The
Secretary may approve an assignment of a mineral agreement without
the consent of the tribe, unless consent is required in the agreement
itself. 58 Finally, the Secretary retains the right to issue notices of
noncompliance and proposed cancellation.59
Despite the central role of the Secretary, the 1982 Act was designed
to accord tribes greater control over the development of their mineral
resources.60 Mineral agreements are negotiated by the tribes and mineral
development takes place only with tribal consent. 6 1 The 1982 Act
expressly provides that tribes must assume more of the risk if they enter
into mineral agreements. While the Secretary remains responsible for
ensuring that the agreement is in the best interests of the tribe, the tribe
62
itself is liable for any losses which it sustains under an agreement.
Nonetheless, the 1982 Act also expressly provides that the Secretary
retains a fiduciary obligation to protect tribes against violations by other
parties and that the Act was not intended to "absolve the United States
from any responsibility to Indians, including those which derive from
the trust relationship." 6 3
The 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act thus preserves the
federal trust obligations to tribes found under the 1983 Indian Mineral
Leasing Act. While the 1982 Act accords tribes greater control over the
55. 25 C.F.R. § 225.24 (1994). The federal laws with which the Secretary must ensure
nd Histoi
comoliance include the National Environmental Policy Act, the Archaeologic
Preservation Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act. Id.
56. 25 C.F.R. § 225.26 (1994).
57. 25 C.F.R. § 225.31 (1994). The regulation provides that prior to production, all bonus and
rent payments "shall be made" to the appropriate officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. After
production, "all payments due for royalties, bonuses, rentals and other payments under a minerals
agreement shall be made to the Secretary or such other party as may be designated." Id.
58. 25 C.F.R. § 225.33 (1994).
59. 25 C.F.R. § 225.36(a) (1994).
60. See generally Royster, supra note 42, at 584-85.
61. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1988). Not only do tribes initiate the mineral agreement process, but the
1982 Act also provides that the Secretary must give the tribe 30 days notice of the Secretary's decision
to approve or disapprove an agreement, along with the Secretary's written findings. Id. § 2103(c).
The notice requirement was intended to ensure that tribes are fully aware of the benefits and risks of
the agreement, and to provide tribes with an opportunity to reconsider. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465. During the notice period, before the Secretary's
approval is final, a tribe may unilaterally rescind the agreement. Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark,
780 F.2d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (1988) (providing that "the United States shall not be liable for losses
sustained by a tribe" under an approved mineral agreement).
63. Id.
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mineral development process, the Secretary's obligations remain detailed
and central to that process. Moreover, the Secretary is expressly directed
to act in the best interests of the tribes in taking action under the 1982
Act. While the Secretary is not a guarantor of tribal profits, 64 Congress
intended the trust obligations to remain intact. 65
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

Federal approval of tribal mineral agreements requires both
procedural and substantive consideration of environmental values.
Procedural protections arise under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA),66 which requires the preparation of an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for all "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 67 Secretarial approval
of mineral development on tribal lands constitutes major federal action
triggering the NEPA requirement that an environmental study be
prepared. 68 Unless an initial environmental assessment results in a
64. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3469-70; S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982),
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3465, 3469-70; S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1982); 128
CONG. REc. 29400 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Melcher).
For the reasons set out in the text, the 1982 Act and its regulations are distinguishable from the
statutes and regulations governing surface leasing of allotted lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1988), 25
C.F.R. pt. 162 (1994). The Court of Federal Claims recently held that the surface leasing scheme does
not create a fiduciary obligation enforceable by an action for breach of trust. Brown v. United States,
32 Cl. Ct. 509, 517 (1994); Wright v. United States, 32 Cl. Ct. 54, 57 (1994). In both cases, the court
noted that the government's role in surface leasing of allotted lands is limited to approval of leases
negotiated by the allottees. Wright, 32 Cl. Ct. at 58; Brown, 32 Cl. Ct. at 517. The Secretary has no
duty to administer the leases or monitor the lessees' performance. Wright, 32 Cl. Ct. at 58; Brown, 32
Cl. Ct. at 516-17. Moreover, the surface leasing scheme does not require the Secretary to act in the
best interests of the Indian owners. Brown, 32 Cl. Ct. at 516.
Under the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act, by contrast, the Secretary's role is far from
limited to final review of agreements negotiated by tribes. The Secretary's specific and continuing
obligations, along with the express command to act at all times "in the best interest" of the tribes,
preserves the federal trust responsibility with respect to tribal mineral resources. See also Brown, 32
Cl. Ct. at 516 (discussing the differences between the surface leasing scheme and that for mineral
development).
66. 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. (1988). See generally Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the
National Environmental Policy Act to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 377
(1991); see also James P. Boggs, NEPA in the Domain of FederalIndian Policy: Social Knowledge and
the Negotiation of Meaning, 19 ENVT'L AFFAIRs 31 (1991).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988).
68. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972) (establishing that federal approval of
leases of Indian lands is major federal action within the meaning of NEPA and specifically noting that
"[tihe fact Indian lands are held in trust does not take it out of NEPA's jurisdiction."). Compliance
with NEPA is now mandated by the regulations implementing the 1982 Indian Mineral Development
Act. 25 C.F.R. § 225.24(a) (1994) (requiring the Secretary to "ensure that all environmental studies
are prepared" for mineral agreements "as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969"). The same regulation has been proposed for mineral leases entered into under the 1938 Indian
Mineral Leasing Act. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734, 58,738 (1991) (proposed at 25 C.F.R. § 211.7).
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finding that the proposed development will have no significant impact
on the environment, 69 the government must prepare an EIS evaluating
the environmental effects of the proposed action and discussing possible
alternative actions.70
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is responsible for the
preparation of environmental impact statements for proposed
development on Indian lands.71 Where more than one federal agency is
involved in the proposed action, the BIA acts as the lead agency, taking
primary responsibility for the EIS;72 other federal agencies with
jurisdiction by law or special expertise may be cooperating agencies,
entitled to participate in the NEPA process from its inception. 7 3 In
addition to their participation in the preparation of the EIS, cooperating
agencies are under a duty to comment on any draft EIS prepared by the
lead agency. 74 The lead agency, in turn, is required to assess, consider,
and respond to those comments in the final EIS.75 Agencies with a
strong interest in proposed mineral development on Indian lands, such as
the Bureau of Land Management, thus have multiple opportunities to
participate in and influence the EIS.
69. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1994). Environmental assessments are generally conducted only for
certain types of proposed actions. Agencies are required to identify those types of actions which
normally require the preparation of an EIS and those types of actions, called categorical exclusions,
which normally do not require either an EIS or an environmental assessment. Id. §§ 1501.4(a),
1507.3(b)(2). Environmental assessments are prepared for any proposed action which does not fall
into either category. Id. § 1501.4(b).
70. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1994). For an explanation of the NEPA "screening process" for
determining when an EIS is necessary, see Suagee, supra note 66, at 396-401. The BIA has
determined that certain types of mineral development activities will normally require an EIS: any
proposed mining contract or combination of contracts for other than oil and gas which involve either
surface coal mines of at least 1280 acres or an annual full production level of 5 million tons or more,
or any other new mine of at least 640 acres. See id. at 476. The BIA has also determined that ..
following actions normally require preparation of an environmental assessment: approval of mineral
prospecting permits, approval of oil and gas contracts, grant of leases and permits for geothermal
exploration and development, and approval of mining contracts encompassing less acreage than
needed to trigger an automatic EIS. Id.
71. See, e.g., Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786,790 (9th Cir. 1975); Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d
556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977) (both noting that the EIS for development on tribal lands was prepared by the
BIA); see also County of San Diego v. Babbitt, 847 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (1994) (providing that the lead agency supervises the preparation of
the EIS).
73. Id. § 1501.6 (1994). An agency has jurisdiction by law if it has "authority to approve, veto,
or finance all or part of the proposal." Id. § 1508.15. An agency has special expertise if it has
"statutory responsibility, agency mission, or related program experience." Id. § 1508.26. The BLM is
an agency with jurisdiction by law or special expertise for mineral development on public lands. 49
Fed. Reg. 49,750, 49,761 (oil and gas), 49,762 (coal), 49,763 (uranium), 49,764 (geothermal), and
49,777 (non-energy minerals) (1984). When a proposed action will have environmental effects "on a
reservation," the governing tribe or tribes "may by agreement with the lead agency become a
cooperating agency." 40 C.F.R. § 1508-5 (1994).
74. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.2 (1994). See also id. § 1503.1(a)(1) (obligating the lead agency to obtain
comments of cooperating agencies), § 1503.1(a)(2)(ii) (obligating the lead agency to request
comments from Indian tribes "when the effects may be on a reservation").
75. Id. § 1503.4(a).
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The EIS
NEPA, however, is purely a procedural statute.
requirement is intended to prevent uninformed actions, but it does not
prohibit actions which may adversely affect the environment. Once a
federal agency has complied with the procedural requirements of an
environmental assessment or an EIS, the agency is free to decide that
"other values outweigh the environmental costs" of the project. 7 6
Because NEPA is procedural only, its applicability can present a
dilemma for tribes seeking development of tribal lands. NEPA may
prove generally advantageous, providing tribes with increased
information prior to entering into leases and agreements. With the
information provided by an EIS, tribes may choose on an
environmentally-informed basis whether to proceed with development
activities, 77 particularly projects such as mineral development which
necessarily have some adverse impacts on the environment. 7 8
Nonetheless, NEPA has substantial disadvantages. To the extent that the
EIS must consider the adverse environmental consequences of tribal
development on lands and resources outside Indian country, it
introduces non-Indian considerations into the Secretary's approval
process. 7 9 Moreover, neighboring non-Indian interests may at least
delay projects on tribal lands by challenging the adequacy of the EIS in
federal court. 8 0
76. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
77. "[Tribes can use the NEPA process to reach better decisions, at least in the environmental
sense. Tribes can also use the NEPA process to make the BIA do likewise." Suagee, supra note 66, at
427.
78. See Royster, supra note 42, at 614-17. For a detailed discussion of the environmental
consequences of uranium mining, see Lise Young, What Price Progress? Uranium Production on
Indian Lands in the San Juan Basin, 9 AM. INDi N L. REv. 1,4-23 (1981).
79. NEPA's implementing regulations simply provide that an EIS should "describe the
environment of the area(s) to be affected." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.15 (1994). The areas affected by tribal
mineral development, or indeed any project giving rise to the necessity for an EIS, will not necessarily
be confined to Indian country. Certainly in the case of a split tribal-federal estate, or in the case of
contiguous tribal and federal tracts, the EIS would necessarily consider environmental impacts on the
federal lands. But see CotaN's HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 531 (noting that to the extent the Secretary
of Interior must consider effects on non-Indian lands, the Secretary's "trust duty may be compromised
and a conflict of interest created between his duty to Indians and his more general duties as head of
the Department of the Interior."). See generally the discussion infra in section V.
80. See, eg., County of San Diego v. Babbitt, 847 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (challenging the
adequacy of the EIS prepared for the Campo Solid Waste Management Project, a tribal project to
construct and operate a solid waste disposal facility). Federal courts have expressly rejected the
argument that only the affected tribe has standing to challenge noncompliance with NEPA regarding
development of tribal minerals. Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 792 (9th Cir. 1975). Nonetheless,
attempts to prevent or delay mineral development through NEPA challenges are not confined to
non-Indians. See, e.g., Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977) (members of the Navajo
Tribe challenged the adequacy of the EIS for uranium mining on tribal lands).
If the agency finds that the proposed action will have no significant environmental impact and
therefore does not prepare an EIS, that finding may also be challenged in court. Both challenges are
procedural. If the court rules against the federal agency, the agency will be ordered to prepare an
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In addition to the procedural consideration mandated by NEPA, the
1982 Indian Mineral Development Act regulations specify substantive
consideration of environmental values. Before approving a mineral
agreement, the Secretary must determine that it "does not have adverse
cultural, social, or environmental impacts sufficient to outweigh its
expected benefits to the Indian mineral owners."8 Federal regulations
thus require the Secretary to make a substantive determination that the
environmental impacts of mineral development are less important than
the putative benefits to the tribe.
While the wording of the regulation is less than clear concerning the
extent of the environmental impacts which the Secretary is to consider,
the context clarifies that it is the environmental impact on the tribe and
its resources rather than the impacts on the surrounding environment
generally. The regulations were proposed to meet multiple federal
goals: "to fulfill [the federal] trust responsibility by providing adequate
provisions to ensure the protection of the trust resources," to benefit the
Indian mineral owners and remove barriers to development, and "to
provide the Tribes as much freedom as possible to make their own
determination" on the development of mineral resources.82 In order for
the Secretary to accomplish these objectives, the regulations provide in
part that the Secretary must balance the adverse environmental impacts
against the expected benefits. If the Secretary is required, or even
permitted, to balance the expected tribal benefits against the
environmental impacts occurring outside the tribe's Indian ,country, the
agency fails in its goals of benefitting the tribal mineral owners and
promoting tribal freedom of choice in the development of mineral
resources.
The 1982 Act thus requires the Secretary to consider the
environmental impacts of mineral development in both procedural and
substantive aspects. As part of the trust responsibilities outlined by the
Act and its regulations, the Secretary must take the "hard look" at
environmental impacts mandated by NEPA. The environmental impacts,
in turn, inform the Secretary's decision whether to approve a proposed
mineral agreement and the tribe's decision whether to proceed.
Moreover, the Secretary is obligated to disapprove a proposed mineral
agreement if the environmental impacts on the tribe will outweigh the
expected benefits of the development. The Secretary's failure to take

EIS or to correct deficiencies in the original EIS. Once the agency has done so, it is nonetheless free
to arrive at the same substantive determination that it made initially.
81. 25 C.F.R. § 225.22(c)(2) (1994).
82. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734,58,734-35 (1991).
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any of these steps mandated by the 1982 Act and its regulations should
be remediable by an action for breach of trust.
IV. THE FEDERAL TRUST AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Conflicts of interest are inherent in the federal administrative
structure. The federal government is not only the trustee for the tribes,
but the representative of the public interest as well. While conflicts of
interest can arise within any department 83 or between departments,84
conflicts are most striking in the Department of the Interior. The
Department of the Interior is charged with representing both the interests
of the tribes on the one hand,8 5 and a variety of public interests in lands
and resources on the other. 86 Where tribal and public interests in the use
of resources collide, the Department is nonetheless obligated to act on
behalf of the tribes and at the same time to pursue programs and policies
87
undertaken for the public interest.
One of the principal duties of any trustee is the duty of undivided
loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary, and the corollary that a trustee
should subordinate its interests to those of the beneficiary. 88 And one of
the principal questions raised by the federal administrative structure is
the extent to which those trustees' duties can or should be preserved in
conflicts situations.8 9 On a number of occasions, the federal courts have
83. One agency that frequently experiences these conflicts is the Justice Department, which is
charged with representing both tribal and federal interests in certain water rights adjudications. Reid
Peyton Chambers, Conflicts of Interest in the Administration of the Federal Trust Responsibility, in
Indian Trust Counsel, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, Comm.. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1971).
84. For example, the Interior Department and the Justice Department have disagreed on
occasion over the extent to which Indian reserved rights to water should be pursued in litigation. See
Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 LAND
& WAmTR L. REv. 1, 19-20 & n.74 (1992).
85. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988). The Bureau of Indian Affairs, charged with the daily
administration of Indian interests, is a subagency of Interior. Id. § 13 (1988).
86. See 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (1988). Congress has charged Interior with the administration of public
lands, mines, reclamation projects, fish and wildlife, national parks, and petroleum conservation. Id.
Subagencies within Interior such as the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, and
Bureau of Mines are the entities representing interests most often at odds with tribal interests.
87. CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 228; Reid Peyton Chambers, A Study of Administrative
Conflicts of Interest in the Protection of Indian Natural Resources, Prepared for the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate 2
(1971).
88. The duty of loyalty obligates a trustee "to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary." REsrATEMENT OF TRUSTS (Second) § 170. See also CoHEWS HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at
227.
89. Commentators have generally argued that the application of fiduciary principles is
particularly necessary in conflicts situations, where political pressure on behalf of the non-Indian
interests can be intense. See CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 228; Chambers, supra note 87, at 3-4;
Adele Fine, Comment, Off-Reservation Enforcement of the Federal-IndianTrust Responsibility, 7 PUB.
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grappled with the proper role for Interior and other federal agencies in
conflict of interest cases. The cases tend to address two sets of
circumstances in which administrative conflicts arise. One situation
involves proposed federal resource development or other federal action
taken outside Indian country which will affect tribal rights and resources.
The other involves conflicting claims to water, which has the
characteristic of being simultaneously both an on- and an off-reservation
resource. The following sections look at these conflict of interest
situations.
A.

OFF-RESERVATION FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT

The off-reservation development cases primarily address the
question of whether the federal government, as trustee for the tribes, can
develop federal resources in a way that harms tribal interests. In
response, the courts have noted that statutes and regulations governing
off-reservation federal actions do not create any full fiduciary
relationship with the tribes. Against that backdrop, the courts have
created essentially a two-tiered approach to the federal government's
trust duties to tribes in undertaking off-reservation activities. First, the
government must consider the environmental impacts on any affected
tribe as a separate concern. But second, having done so, the government
may generally meet its trust responsibility if it complies with the
mandates of the applicable environmental laws. Having considered the
tribal interests separately, the agency is entitled to balance those tribal
interests against the competing interests. In deciding whether to proceed
with off-reservation federal development, the government is thus entitled
to weigh the adverse impacts on the tribe against public and national
interests.
The government's obligation to separately consider impacts on the
tribes arises under both the applicable federal statutes and the federal
trust obligation. In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel,90 for example,
the tribe challenged federal coal leases for several tracts of land that lay
in close proximity to the reservation on three sides. The environmental
LAND. L. REv. 117,132 (1986).

90. 12 Indian L. Rep. 3065 (D. Mont. 1985). The district court entered an order voiding the coal
leases at issue, but subsequently amended its injunction to suspend rather than void the leases. Id. On
appeal by the tribe from the amended injunction, the Ninth Circuit held that the injunction should be
further modified and remanded for that purpose. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152
(9th Cir. 1988). The lessees then moved to void the leases and the district court granted their motion.
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Lujan, 804 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mont. 1991). In that 1991 opinion, the
district court noted that its original holding that the government had violated NEPA, the Federal Coal
Leasing Act Amendments, and the trust obligation to the tribes (the issues discussed here in the text)
had not been addressed or disturbed by the appellate court. "This holding stands today as the law of
the case." Id. at 1285.
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impact statement for the coal leases made little mention of the tribe or its
land, and the concerns of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe were "largely
ignored."91 The government argued that it had considered the impacts
on the tribal members "simply as people affected" by the leases, but the
court rejected the government's position. 92 The Northern Cheyenne
Tribe was "culturally discrete," with a government and economy that
93
"differ substantially" from neighboring off-reservation communities.
Because reservation communities are not "similarly situated" to
off-reservation areas, the government was obligated under NEPA to
consider the unique impacts of coal development on the tribe. 9 4 The
government's failure to consider the impacts on the tribe as a tribe
rendered the EIS inadequate.95
Moreover, the court held, separate consideration of the impacts on
the tribe was mandated by the federal trust obligation. The government's
trust duty extends to federal actions taken off-reservation which impact
the tribe. 96 That duty, the court said, "at the very least" requires the
Secretary to "investigate and consider" the impacts of off-reservation
development on the tribe as a separate entity.97 The court rejected the
government's argument that its trust obligation to the tribe was lessened
because coal development was in the national interest. Instead, the court
found that the trust responsibility was even more crucial in situations
where the agency's conflict was between tribal interests and other goals
for which political pressures might lead the agency to compromise the
rights of the tribe.98 In consequence, the court held that the Secretary
had violated duties created both by federal statute and the federal trust
responsibility to the tribe.99
As noted, those duties include the obligation to investigate and take
account in the decisionmaking process of the impacts on the tribe as a
91. Id. at 3068. The tribe's concerns centered on the social, cultural, and economic disruption of
the coal leases, not the impacts on the natural or physical environment. Id. at 3066. But NEPA
regulations define effects or impacts broadly to include not only ecological effects, but also "aesthetic,
historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative." 40 C.F.R. §
1508.8(b) (1994). While economic or social effects are not sufficient in themselves to trigger the
need for an EIS, they must be considered when an EIS is prepared. Id. § 1508.14 Northern
Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3067.
92. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3068.
93. Id. at 3068-69.
94. Id. at 3069.
95. Id. The court also held that because the Federal Coal Leasing Act Amendments required the
Secretary to consider the socioeconomic impacts on the tribe, the government was also in violation of
that act. Id. at 3069-70.
96. Id. at 3070-71.
97. Northern Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rep. at 3071.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3074.
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separate entity from the surrounding non-Indian environment. If the
investigation reveals no substantial impacts on the tribe, then proceeding
with federal off-reservation development does not violate any fiduciary
obligation.
For example, in Nance v. Environmental Protection
Agency,OO the Crow Tribe claimed that the EPA had violated the federal
trust obligation when it approved redesignation of air quality for the
abutting Northern Cheyenne Reservation, on the ground that the
redesignation would adversely affect coal development on Crow lands.101
The court found that EPA had specifically considered whether strip
mining on the Crow Reservation would be affected by the redesignation,
and had concluded that it would not. 10 2 Having considered the concerns
of the Crow Tribe, and determined that the off-reservation action would
have no effect on Crow coal development, the EPA fulfilled the federal
trust obligation to the Crow Tribe.103
Similarly, the Supreme Court determined in Amoco Production
Company v. Village of Gambell that because oil and gas exploration on
the outer continental shelf would "not significantly restrict" Alaska
Native subsistence uses, the federal government could proceed with the
lease sales. 10 4 Alaska Native villages claimed that the federal leases
100. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981). Nance is, of course, an oddity in the off-reservation
conflicts cases. First, the federal government was not engaged in development which might be
harmful to tribal interests, but in environmental protection activities. And second, the federal activity
which was off-reservation for the Crow Tribe was on-reservation for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe.
The court in fact noted that the federal government was faced with "conflicting fiduciary obligations"
to the two tribes. Because the court found, however, that no harm would result to the Crow Tribe from
the Northern Cheyenne redesignation, it also found no breach of fiduciary duty to the Crow Tribe. Id.
at 711-12.
101. Id. at 710-11. The redesignation was from Class H. which permits a moderate amount of
deterioration in air quality, to Class I, which permits very little. Id. at 705; see 42 U.S.C. § 7473
(1988).
102. 645 F.2d at 706, 711.
103. Id. at 711. The court noted that in hindsight, the agency finding was incorrect. Id. At the
time the Northern Cheyenne proposed to redesignate the air quality, strip mining was not one of the
categories of air pollutant sources that required a preconstruction review to determine whether the
source would violate air quality. Id. at 706. During the pendency of the Northern Cheyenne petition,
Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require preconstruction review for any source emitting in
excess of 250 tons of any air pollutant. Id. The court, however, determined that EPA was not
obligated to take the amendments into account, for three reasons. First, it was unclear whether fugitive
emissions from strip mining would be subject to the amended regulations. Second, it was unclear at
what point Congress was so certain to enact the proposed amendments that the EPA should take
account of them. And third, all of the agency action preliminary to final approval, including hearings
and comments, had been taken prior to enactment of the amendments. Id. at 707-08. The fact that
EPA's assessment of no impact on Crow coal development may have been wrong in light of subsequent
events, however, "does not affect the answer to the question of whether the fiduciary responsibilities
were fulfilled in the first place." Id. at 711. In fact, the Crow Tribe was correct that Northern
Cheyenne redesignation would adversely affect Crow development plans. The redesignation
"contributed to the demise" of Crow plans for coal gasification plant and a coal-fired power plant.
AMBLER, supra note 1, at 184.
104. 480 U.S. 531,544 (1987). The issue in Village of Gambell was whether the Alaska Natives
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violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),
which requires the government to "evaluate the effect" of leases on
Native subsistence uses and needs. 10 5 The Court noted that ANILCA
does not prohibit federal actions which adversely affect subsistence uses,
but rather establishes a procedure that requires consideration of the
impacts. 106 The Secretary is expressly permitted to weigh the
development of energy resources against subsistence uses and to
reconcile those competing public and tribal interests. 107 If the Secretary
determines that development of federal lands is necessary and takes steps
to ameliorate harm to subsistence uses, the federal development can
proceed despite significant adverse impacts on subsistence uses.108 In
this case, the Secretary of the Interior determined that neither
preliminary nor exploration stage activities would have any significant
effect on subsistence uses; the Secretary also found that although
development and production activities could significantly restrict
subsistence uses in limited areas for limited periods in the event of a
major oil spill, those activities were unlikely to occur. 109 Accordingly,
since the oil and gas leases would have no significant impact on
subsistence uses, the exploration would not be enjoined.110
The Ninth Circuit reached an identical conclusion based on trust
doctrine principles in North Slope Borough v. Andrus.111 The Inupiat
people challenged a federal lease sale of oil and gas properties in the
outer continental shelf on the ground of potential damage to the
Bowhead whale. The Bowhead whales, protected under the Endangered
Species Act, are crucial to the Inupiat subsistence lifestyle. Not only do
the Bowhead constitute an important food source, but the culture of the
tribe revolves around whaling, and in particular the hunt for the
Bowhead.1l 2 The Inupiats claimed that the oil and gas leases threatened
both the whale species and Inupiat subsistence and culture. The court
specifically determined that the Secretary of the Interior was entitled to
balance the interests of the Inupiat against other public concerns, and
were entitled to a preliminary injunction, not whether the government had met its fiduciary obligations.
Nonetheless, the analysis is instructive.
105. Id. at 535 & n.2; see ANILCA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. §3120(a). If the leases will significantly
restrict subsistence use, the government must determine that the restriction is "necessary" and must
ensure "reasonable steps" to minimize the adverse impacts. Id. § 3120(a)(3).
106. 480 U.S. at 544.
107. Id. at 545-46.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 538-39.
110. Id. at 546.
111. 642 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 593.
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that no one interest should have a veto over the Secretary's decision.ll 3
The court then found that the Secretary gave "purposeful attention" to
the concerns and needs of the Inupiats and followed advice aimed at
easing potential adverse impacts on them."l 4 The court also found that
the Secretary had complied with the Endangered Species Act.l' 5 Having
complied with the Act and having specifically considered the interests of
the Inupiats, the court held, the Secretary had satisfied the limited trust
obligation owed to the tribe. 116
In other cases as well the courts have held that federal compliance
with applicable environmental laws constitutes compliance with the trust
obligation. In Havasupai Tribe v. United States,"l7 for example, the
tribe challenged a Forest Service plan of operations for a uranium mine
on federal lands. The proposed site of the mine was land sacred to the
Havasupai people."l 8 The court noted, and the tribe conceded, that the
Forest Service had addressed in detail the tribe's religious concerns in
the final environmental impact statement. 1 1 9 Having done so, having
taken the requisite "hard look" at the impacts of the proposed action,
the agency had complied with NEPA.120 And, having complied with
NEPA, the Forest Service met "any general fiduciary duty it-may have
had" to the tribe. 12 1
113. Id. at 612-13.
114. Id. at 612.
115. Id. at 607.
116. The court noted that no statute, treaty, or executive order created a trust obligation to the
Inupiat people with regard to the Bowhead whale. In consequence, the federal trust obligation to the
tribe was a limited trust only. Id. at 611-12. The court then apparently equated the limited trust
obligation with the Secretary's obligations under the Endangered Species Act on the ground that the
concerns of the Inupiat people were "parallel" to those of the environment. Id. at 612. Because "the
substantive interests of the Natives and of their native environment are congruent." the Secretary's
protection of the latter under the Endangered Species Act constituted protection of the former under
the federal trust responsibility. Id.
117. 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd sub nom., Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d
32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1559 (1992).
The tribe did not appeal the holdings discussed in the text.
118. Id. at 1476.
119. Id. at 1493, 1498-99. The tribe did argue that the Forest Service could have made a greater
effort. Id. The court noted, however, that the agency repeatedly requested specific information on
Havasupai religious practices and that the tribe, for religious reasons, refused to provide more detailed
information. Id. at 1499-1500. Under those circumstances, the court found that the Forest Service
"took every reasonable step" to address the tribe's religious concerns. Id. More recently, the Tenth
Circuit disagreed that similar actions by the Forest Service were reasonable. Pueblo of Sandia v.
United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995). In Sandia, the tribe indicated to the Forest Service the
existence of traditional cultural properties under the National Historic Preservation Act, but
repeadedly declined to provide the Forest Service with specific information. Id. at 859-60. The court
noted that secrecy is crucial to the tribe's religious and cultural practices. Id. at 861. The court
therefore concluded that the Forest Service, based on the information communicated to it and the
reasons why the Pueblo did not provide more specific information, did not make a reasonable effort to
identify the properties. Id. at 861-62.
120. Id. at 1500.
121. Id. at 1489.
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In a similar action, the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Medicinemen's
Association challenged recreational development of national forest lands
because the lands were sacred to both tribes.12 2 The court found that the
Forest Service had not violated its trust responsibility to the tribes. That
duty was defined by the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA), which requires only that federal agencies take account of
Indian religions in developing their policies and procedures.1 23 Because
the Forest Service evaluated its development plan with the aim of
protecting Hopi and Navajo religion, the agency complied with
AIRFA.124 And because the agency complied with AIRFA, it also
complied with any fiduciary duty or obligation which that statute
imposed on the federal government.125 Once again, the court noted that
the federal government may weigh the interests of the tribe against the
interests of the off-reservation development on federal lands, and that
nothing in AIRFA required that tribal concerns "always prevail to the
exclusion of all else."1 2 6
The off-reservation development cases thus form a pattern. None of
the statutes applicable in the cases created a full fiduciary relationship
between the government and the tribes. The statutes rather created at
most a limited trust, an obligation on the part of the government to
specifically consider the impacts of the proposed federal action on the
tribe as a separate entity. Once the agency expressly evaluated and
considered the tribe's concerns, however, it had met its trust obligations.
The agency was then free to balance the concerns of the tribes against
other national interests, and to find that the non-tribal interests prevailed.
B.

WATER RESOURCES CONFLICTS

The law of administrative conflicts is most notorious in the context
of water resources. Here the conflict of interest involves a common
resource, the availability of an often-limited water supply, rather than an
off-reservation activity that will impact tribal interests within Indian
country. Many of the cases dealing with water law conflicts have
focused on the federal government's dual representation of both tribal
and federal interests in the course of litigation. In those cases, the courts
122. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 19 ERC (BNA) 1215 (D.D.C. 1981).
123. Id. § C. [Section C of the opinion was omitted from the Environmental Reporter Cases
(ERC); the full text of the opinion is available on LEXIS, Genfed Dist file.] AIRFA thus did not create
a full fiduciary relationship between the federal government and the tribes. Id. at 1219-20.
124. Id.§ C [omitted from ERC reporter].
125. Id.at 1220.
126. Id.§ C [omitted from ERC reporter]. The court also made the same finding regarding
consideration of tribal religious interests under NEPA. Id. at 1221.
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have refused to find any harm to tribal interests from the fact of dual
representation, noting that Congress has authorized the government to
act simultaneously on behalf of both tribes and federal concerns. In
other cases, the courts have focused on whether harm has occurred to
tribal interests from the government's dual obligations regarding water.
Where the tribe can show actual or likely harm, the courts will hold the
government to its fiduciary obligations. But where the harm is not clear,
or as in dual representation, not present, the courts are dismissive of
tribal claims of conflict of interest.
The federal government is responsible for litigating tribal rights to
water. Under its general trust obligation, the government has authority
both to bring water rights claims on behalf of the tribes and to bind the
tribes in the litigation.1 27 In the McCarran Amendment of 1952,
Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, permitting
the federal government to be joined as a party in general stream
adjudications in state court. 12 8 Although the McCarran Amendment
does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and therefore does not
permit the involuntary joinder of tribes as parties, the Supreme Court has
held that the amendment does permit state courts to adjudicate the
tribes' water rights by exercising jurisdiction, over the federal government.129 As a result, the litigation of tribal rights to water in both
federal and state courts is almost exclusively in the hands of federal
litigators. 130
The federal government is also responsible for litigating the water
rights of federal projects and federal lands. In both federal and state
courts, 13 1 the United States is obligated to assert the water rights of a

127. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 626-27 (1983) (original action in the Supreme
Court in which the United States intervened on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the tribes);
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135 (1983) (action brought by United States on behalf of tribe).
128. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988); see United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 401 U.S.
520 (1971).
129. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,566 n.17 (1983).
130. One commentator notes that even though the Wind River Tribes were parties to the general
stream adjudication of the Big Horn River, transcripts showed that the courts "looked principally to the
[federal] government's attorneys to defend the reserved rights doctrine." Membrino, supranote 84, at
18 (referencing the case of In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd by an equally divided court sub nom., Wyoming v.
United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989)).
131. As noted, the McCarran Amendment authorized the determination of federal water rights in
the course of state court general stream adjudications. ColoradoRiver Water Conservation Dist., 424
U.S. at 809-13; San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 566 n.17.
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variety of federal entities, including reclamation projects, 132 as well as to
claim reserved Water rights for federal reservations. 133
In any given water adjudication, then, the United States may be
asserting both the rights of the tribes and the rights of federal projects or
federally-reserved lands to the same source of water. That dual
representation has dual difficulties. First, the federal government
historically gave preference to the development of water resources for
non-Indian use, and particularly for non-Indian agriculture, to the
detriment of the tribes.1 34 If tribes are concerned that the federal
government also gave preference in litigation to non-Indian federal
water rights, that concern "cannot be dismissed as implausible on its
face."' 13 5 Second, given the over-appropriated state of many western
streams, the government may well be placed in a position where
vigorously pursuing the rights of one client may reduce the amount of
water available to satisfy the rights of another. In particular, since tribal
rights to water tend to predate most non-Indian uses, 136 zealous litigation
of tribal rights to water may leave insufficient water available for other
federal uses once senior non-reserved rights are satisfied. In either case,
federal representation of conflicting interests in water resources would
appear to violate the trustee's duty of undivided loyalty.13 7
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that where Congress has
required the federal government to represent both tribal and federal
interests in water rights litigation, the government cannot be held to the
standards of a private trustee. 138 In Nevada v. United States, the federal
132. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 127-28 (1983) (noting the federal government's
obligation to protect the rights of the Newlands Reclamation Project, based on the government's title to
the Project's water rights and the Reclamation Act of 1902).
133. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-42 (1976) (addressing reserved water
rights for the Devil's Hole National Monument); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698-705
(1978) (addressing reserved water rights for the Gila National Forest).
134. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER PociES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT 474-75
(1973); LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDLAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMrs OF LAW 21-23 (1991).
135. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 784 F.2d 921,925 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1006 (1986).
136. Depending upon the source of tribal water rights, the priority date for tribal rights is either
.time immemorial:' United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984), or the date the tribe's reservation was created. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600
(1963); Winters v. United States. 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). See generally Judith V. Royster, A Primer
on Indian Water Rights, 30 TILSA LJ. 61, 70-71 (1994). In one case, a court refused to determine
whether the Mescalero Apache Tribe had a priority date of time immemorial because a priority date
based on the tribe's 1852 peace treaty would give the tribe the senior water right in the area in any
case. New Mexico ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 238 (N.M. App. 1993), cert. denied, 858
P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993).
137. See Chambers, supra note 87, at 2.
138. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 142 (1983). The Nevada decision has been the
subject of considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Roger Florio, Water Rights: Enforcing the
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government itself attempted to reopen a 1944 water decree to assert
additional water rights on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Reservation.139 The government argued that because it had represented
both the tribe and a federal reclamation project in the litigation, there
was no adversity of interest between the claimants, and that without
adversity, the decree could not be binding as between the tribe and the
reclamation project.14 0 The Supreme Court, however, determined that
the interests were sufficiently adverse. Not only had the federal
government pleaded the claimants' interests separately, but the
reclamation interests had also been represented after 1926 by the local
irrigation district.141
The Court dismissed the argument that the federal conflict of
interest obviated the necessary adversity. While it recognized that the
federal government owed "a strong fiduciary duty" to the tribe and
more specifically a duty to represent the tribe in water rights litigation,
the Court expressly refused to hold the government to the standards of a
private fiduciary.14 2 Where Congress requires the federal government to
act both as a trustee for the tribes and as a representative of reclamation
projects, the government does not owe a duty of undivided loyalty to the
tribes. The Court found it "simply unrealistic" that the government
could not, as required by Congress, represent both interests
adequately.143
In Nevada, the government and the tribe as intervenor had argued
specifically that the government breached its trust responsibility to the
tribe by failing to assert a tribal water right for the maintenance of the
Pyramid Lake fishery.144 The district court in the Nevada litigation
recognized that water for fishery maintenance created a direct "conflict
of purposes" with the government's assertion of significant water rights
for the reclamation project.14 5 Nonetheless, the district court found, that
the government resolved the conflict within the executive branch by
"political and policy decisions" to ignore the fishery right.14 6 The
Federal-IndianTrust After Nevada v. United States, 13 AM. INDIAI L. REv. 79, 94 (1975) (noting that
Nevada "effectively sever[ed] water adjudication from the government's trust responsibilities"). The
most succinct statement of the general reaction belongs to Professor Laurence: "Nevada v. United
States goes. The government needs to be told to get serious about the prevention of conflicts of
interest." Laurence, supra note 35, at 16.
139. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 113.
140. Id. at 137-39.
141. Id. at 140.
142. Id. at 128, 142.
143. Id. at 128. See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S 605,627 (1983).
144. The government did assert and obtain a water right for the tribe for irrigation. Nevada, 463
U.S. at 117-18.
145. See id. at 137-38 n.15 (quoting the district court's findings).
146. Id. at 138 n.15.
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Supreme Court noted that this finding "reflects the nature of a
democratic government this is charged with more than one
responsibility."1 47 The Court also subsequently noted that the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe had been compensated for the loss of its fishery water
148
right, in the amount of $8 million.
One of the central factors in the Court's decision in Nevada was the
need for finality and certainty in water rights. The Court noted that the
adjudication resulting in the 1944 decree was intended by all parties to
be a comprehensive determination of water rights. Not only the parties
to the litigation, but subsequent appropriators on the stream, relied upon
the 1944 decree as finally and definitively setting the water rights of the
parties to that decree. 14 9 However persuasive that point may have been
in Nevada, in which the government sought to reopen the decree nearly
thirty years after it was entered, it should carry no weight when a tribe
raises the federal conflict of interest in an on-going or anticipated water
rights suit. Nonetheless, the federal courts have rejected tribal claims of
conflicts during the course of litigation. In White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Hodel, 150 the tribe claimed that the federal government could
not adequately represent it in water rights litigation because the
government intended to subordinate tribal claims to claims for
reclamation projects.1 5 1 The court noted that the tribe's allegation was
"serious" and not necessarily "implausible on its face," but
nonetheless refused the tribe any relief. 152 If the tribe wished to protect
its own interests rather than rely solely on the federal government, the
court said, it should intervene in the litigation.1 53
147. Id.
148. Id. at 135 n.14. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States, 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. 256,269
(1975) (approving a compromise settlement awarding the tribe $8 million in damages for not having
received all of the water it was entitled to under its water rights). One of the stipulations of the
settlement was an agreement by the tribe and government that "no water rights reserved for the
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation have been lost, diminished or taken by reason of anything that has
happened or been done between 1859 and the present." Id. at 261. The settlement was entered into
after the Indian Claims Commission determined that the creation of the Pyramid Lake Reservation
impliedly reserved water for the maintenance of the lake and the fishery; that the tribe "did not
receive as much water as could have been beneficially used;" and that the federal government had an
obligation to the tribe to preserve the waters and fisheries of Pyramid Lake. Northern Paiute Nation v.
United States, 30 Ind. Cl. Comm. 210,215,217-18 (1973).
149. 463 U.S. at 143-44.
150. 784 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1006 (1986).
151. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 784 F.2d 921, 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1006 (1986).
152. Id. at 925.
153. Id. at 924-25. The tribes' ability to intervene in water rights litigation has not always been
protected. The Pima Tribal Council attempted to intervene in 1935 to protest a consent decree that had
been stipulated to by the United States and submitted to the federal court for approval. Gila River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 684 F.2d 852, 860 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1982). The federal
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Nevada and White Mountain in concert leave tribes with no option
other than acceptance of government representation. The court in White
Mountain refused to hear the merits of the tribe's claim of conflict of
interest, noting that it "cannot be determined in advance of the fact."1 54
But the Court in Nevada held that it also cannot be determined after the
fact. In other words, a tribe cannot assert federal conflict of interest
prior to final determination in a water rights suit because the claim is
premature, and cannot assert federal conflict of interest subsequent to
final determination because of res judicata and the particular need in
water rights for finality and certainty.
Courts consistently offer tribes the promise of a breach of trust
action if the federal government fails to properly represent tribal
interests, 155 but damages in breach are not water rights.1 56 Moreover,
breach of trust based on a federal conflict of interest is difficult to prove.
For example, in Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States,157 the tribe
claimed damages for breach based on the government's allegedly
inadequate representation of the tribe's water rights in the litigation that
led to the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Arizona v. California.15 8
The tribe claimed that the government's conflict of interest in Arizona1 5 9
led the government attorneys to omit more than 26,000 irrigable acres
from the tribe's asserted water rights.16 0 The court dismissed the tribe's
action, noting that more than thirty years had elapsed since the alleged
breach. 16 1 As a result, witnesses were deceased or their memories were
hazy, and documents had been destroyed.1 62 Documents that were still
government opposed the intervention, in part on the ground that the tribe was already represented, and
the court in fact denied the request to intervene. Id.
Whether tribes today have a right to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), or may merely be
permitted to do so at the discretion of the court under Rule 24(b), is not entirely clear. The Tenth
Circuit has held that a tribe has a right to intervene in situations where a conflict of interest exists
between the tribe and other interests of the federal government. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d
1102, 1106 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977). But the Aamodt court also noted that
"[t]he claim that the Pueblos are adequately represented by government counsel is not impressive."
Id. Since the Supreme Court subsequently held that government representation is adequate, even
where conflicts exist, it is not certain whether tribes may continue to intervene as of right.
154. 784 F.2d at 925.
155. Id.; see also supra note 148 (discussing the Pyramid Lake Paiute's breach of trust action
against the United States).
156. Damages can, at least in theory, be used to purchase water rights if a market exists. But any
additional purchased rights would be state-law appropriation rights, subject to state regulation and
administration, and undoubtedly with a far more recent priority date than tribal reserved rights.
157. 32 Fed.Cl. 29 (Cl. Ct. 1994).
158. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
159. The case was an original action in the Supreme Court filed by Arizona to determine rights to
the waters of the Colorado River. The United States subsequently intervened, id. at 551 n.3, to assert
reserved water rights for five Indian reservations as well as national forests, recreational and wildlife
areas, and "other government lands and works." Id. at 595.
160. Fort Mojave, 32 Fed.Cl. at 32-33.
161. Id. at 34.
162. Id. at 33-34.
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in existence "often do not explain why the government took the actions
that it did."163 The only solid evidence the tribe could point to was a
1975 memorandum by a government attorney in the Arizona litigation
who was removed from the case in the mid-1950s. The attorney alleged
that the government had a conflict of interest and specified the tribal
acreage that the government omitted at trial. 164 The court apparently
gave little or no weight to that memorandum because it held that, since
the tribe was "unable to provide significant additional evidence" to
support the conflict of interest claim, the tribe "simply failed to
demonstrate" an actionable breach of trust by the government.16 5
Tribal claims for damages for breach of trust based on federal
conflicts of interest outside the litigation context have not fared much
better. One of the themes of the litigation conflicts cases is the notion
that the tribes do not suffer any harm from federal representation of
both tribal and federal claims.166 Even where federal representation was
less than aggressive, courts have excused the impact on tribal water rights
as representing simple calculation errors or "cautious litigation
strategy."1 67 Similarly, courts have been dismissive of tribal complaints
that federal authorities improperly gave preference to non-Indian water
projects to the detriment of the tribes, in the absence of proof that the
tribes suffered actual harm.
In Gila River Pima-MaricopaIndian Community v. United States, 168
for example, the tribes claimed that the government failed to protect
tribal water rights against upstream diversions by non-Indian irrigators.
The Court of Claims held that because the Gila River Reservation was
created to protect the existing agricultural community against white
incursions, the United States had undertaken a special relationship for
the protection of the tribes' water supply.1 6 9 That special relationship, in
turn, obligated the federal government, once upstream diversions
interfered with the supply of water to the reservation, to take action to
end the diversions or to supply the tribes with an alternative source of
163. Id. at 34.
164. Id. at 32.
165. FortMojave, 32 Fed.Cl. at 32.
166. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (finding no breach of any governmental
duty to the tribes "solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's
consent").
167. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605,628 n.21 (1983).
168. 684 F.2d 852 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
169. Id. at 861-62. Because this action was brought under the fair and honorable dealings clause
of the Indian Claims Commission Act, the tribe had to show a "special relationship" rather than a trust
relationship in order to recover damages. See Newton, supra note 18, at 776-84 (discussing the fair
and honorable dealings clause).
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water. 170 However, the court determined that the United States had met
its obligation as of 1905, when Congress appropriated $50,000 to begin
an irrigation project on the reservation. 17 1 Eventually, under the
irrigation projects authorized in 1905, the tribes were able to irrigate
more acreage than they could have irrigated under the erratic natural
1 72
flow conditions that existed prior to white settlement and diversion.
Accordingly, the court held, after the appropriation in 1905, the tribes
suffered no injury from the on-going upstream diversions. 173
Similarly, the court dismissed claims by the Gila River tribes that in
the years prior to 1946, the government's lease policy required lessees to
obtain an off-reservation source of water, and that consequent
off-reservation pumping lowered the water table under the reservation
and depleted groundwater needed for irrigation of tribal lands. 174 The
Claims Court held that although groundwater is a valuable resource and
groundwater use had "substantially" lowered the water table throughout
central Arizona, including the tribes' reservation, the tribes had not
shown any injury. The tribes failed to show that the off-reservation
pumping deprived them of any water which they could have beneficially
used at the time. 175
In another case, the court termed the tribe's injury
"conjectural."1 7 6 In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, the
tribe claimed that the government managed the flow of the Salt River to
benefit a reclamation project located downstream of the White Mountain
Reservation, and consequently diverted water from the tribe. 17 7 The
court quoted extensively from Interior Department documents of 1913
that noted the government's conflict of interest and posited that the
government "would be bound to fulfill its engagements in respect to the

170. 684 F.2d at 863.
171. Id. at 858,863.
172. d. at 861-63.
173. Id. at 863. The court did hold the federal government liable for its failure to take action
prior to 1905, and remanded to the trial division to determine the appropriate amount of damages. Id.
at 865. The court used 1905 as the cut-off date for injury even though that year represented only the
appropriation for an irrigation project, and not the actual supply of water to offset upstream diversions.
Id. at 863.
174. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 9 CI. Ct. 660, 697 (1986),
affd, 877 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
175. Id. at 701. On appeal, the Gila River tribes argued that the Claims Court erred in deciding
the issue because the tribes had raised it only in order to rebut the government's proposed findings of
fact. Id. at 964. The Federal Circuit determined that the tribes' assertion was "untrue," and therefore,
because the tribes had not challenged the Claims Court's decision on the merits, let the lower court
holding stand. Id. at 964-65.
176. White Mountain Apache Tribe of Arizona v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 642 (1987), affd
without opinion, 5 F.3d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (opinion published at 20 Indian L. Rep. 2156 (1993)),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1538 (1994).
177. Id. at 627.
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Reclamation project, even though by doing so it was hampered in the use
of the water for the Indian Reservation." 17 8 The court agreed with the
tribe that Interior "failed to understand the law" of reserved rights,
under which the tribe's earlier priority date gave it first right to the
water. 17 9 The court even agreed that federal management of the reclamation project was marked by "incompetence and maladministration,
especially regarding balancing the interests of the tribes on the Gila
River reservation in favor of land speculators."180
Nonetheless, citing Nevada v. United States for the proposition that
the federal government may simultaneously fulfill obligations to both
tribes and reclamation projects,' 8 ' the court held that the White Mountain
Apache Tribe had failed to prove that the government either diverted the
tribe's water to downstream users or otherwise interfered with the tribe's
reserved rights to water.18 2 The court found that the government at no
time prevented the tribe from diverting water for use on the
reservation.1 8 3 Moreover, it determined that any harm resulting from
federal mismanagement of the reclamation project was inflicted not only
on the White Mountain Apache Tribe, but also on other tribes and on
non-Indian farmers.184 Because persons other than the tribe suffered
harm from the government's emphasis on the reclamation project, the

178. Id. at 633.
179. Id. at 638.
180. Id. at 629.
181. White Mountain Apache, 11 Cl. Ct. at 628 (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983)).
182. Id. at 644. The White Mountain Apache Tribe also claimed damages for harm caused to its
rangeland by non-Indian overgrazing pursuant to a permit system established by the federal
government. The tribe claimed that the government carried out a policy of overgrazing "for the
purpose of increasing the flow of water from the reservation for the benefit of downstream users."
Id. at 648. The court found that because the government "initiated and condoned" the conditions that
led to overgrazing and erosion, it was liable for damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 659. The
court expressly rejected, however, the contention that the government had deliberately done so in
order to increase the water available to the downstream reclamation project. The court found that at
most, the tribe proved only that the government was aware of some of the consequences of its actions.
Id. at 661. In a subsequent case to recover damages for the government's failure to obtain adequate
grazing fees, the tribe's expert witness discovered documentary evidence of collusion between
non-Indian ranchers and the Fort Apache Agency Superintendent, including a 1912 letter discussing
the superintendent's forced resignation. White Mountain Apache Tribe of Arizona v. United States, 25
Cl. Ct. 333, 335 (1992). Although that evidence may have been relevant to the tribe's claims
concerning the state of the rangeland. the Claims Court expressly restricted its use to the grazing fees
phase of the litigation. Id. n.2.
183. White Mountain Apache, 11 Cl. Ct. at 642. The court also found that the government was
under no affirmative obligation to develop irrigation facilities for the tribe. Id. Its only obligation,
apparently, was negative: a duty not to interfere rather than a duty to assist. See McSloy, supra note
18, at 601-02.
184. White Mountain Apache, 11 Cl. Ct. at 629.
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court apparently determined that no conflict of interest between the
reclamation project and the tribe's interests existed.1 8 5
Where a tribe can show actual harm from the government's
conflicting obligations, however, the courts are willing to hold the
government to fiduciary standards. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton,I86 the tribe challenged water allocation regulations as arbitrary
and capricious. The federal government had established regulations for
delivery of water to the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District for the
following year. Water provided to the District is diverted from the
Truckee River upstream of Pyramid Lake and the Paiute Reservation that
encompasses it. The Truckee River is virtually the only source of water
for the Lake; over the years, reduced flows had lowered the. lake level by
some seventy feet, caused erosion and salinity problems, and forced the
native Pyramid Lake fish species onto the endangered species list.187
In setting regulations for how much water could be diverted from
the Truckee, the Secretary of the Interior took recommendations and
advice from a variety of sources, including agencies representing both
the tribe and the Bureau of Reclamation, and made a "judgment call"
on allocation of the water.1 8 8 The court held not only that a judgment
call was arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking in violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 189 but also that the Secretary's failure to
comply with the trust obligation to the tribes was an abuse of
discretion.1 90 The court held the government to "'the most exacting
fiduciary standards"' in determining how much water would be diverted
away from Pyramid Lake.1 9 1 It was not enough for the government to
assert the tribe's water right in court; the government was obligated to
preserve water for the tribe to the fullest extent consistent with

185. The argument is reminiscent of the old pregnancy discrimination case. Even though only
women can become pregnant, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not gender discrimination
but discrimination between a class of pregnant women and a class of men plus non-pregnant women.
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reversed by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(h) (1988). The Claims Court apparently decided that if the government wrongfully
diverted tribal plus other water to a reclamation project, the government therefore manifested no
conflict of interest between pursuing the tribe's rights and those of the reclamation project.
186. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). As noted earlier, the Claims Court held that the Gila River
tribes were entitled to recover for the years during which the federal government did nothing to
protect the tribes' water supplies against upstream non-Indian diversions. Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community v. United States, 684 F.2d 852, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1982). The Gila River case, however,
was not an instance where the federal government had conflicting obligations to tribal and federal
water rights. Instead, it was a case of a direct conflict between upstream state-law water users and the
downstream tribe.
187. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 255.
188. Id. at 256.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 257.
191. Id. at 256 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,297 (1942)).
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contractual obligations to the Irrigation District. 192 A judgment call, the
court held, was calculated to "placate temporarily conflicting claims" to
1 93
the water, and not to fulfill the trust obligation to the tribe.
Accordingly, the court ordered the Secretary to repromulgate the
regulations.
The central feature in the federal courts' approach to tribal claims
of conflict of interest thus seems to be whether the conflict has caused or
will cause some measurable injury to the tribe. Where at least the
likelihood of harm is clear, as in Pyramid Lake, the courts will hold the
government to strict fiduciary standards in resolving the conflicting
claims to the water resource. Where the likelihood of harm is conjectural
or unproven or otherwise not clear, the courts will lend little credence to
tribal claims of federal conflict of interest. The primary difficulty with
those cases is the courts' crabbed view of what constitutes injury. In
particular, the Nevada-based refusal to see the mere fact of dual
representation or dual obligations as injury leaves tribes with only the
after-the-fact alternative of a damages action for breach of trust if the
government's conflict can subsequently be shown to have caused actual
injury. Only in the rare instances where tribes can show probable harm
from conflicts inherent in on-going management of water resources,
such as Pyramid Lake, will tribes be able successfully to assert the trust
doctrine against the federal government. Absent that showing, tribes
cannot prevent the federal government from weighing and reconciling
its competing obligations rather than focusing on its fiduciary duty to
the tribes.
V.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN TRIBAL MINERAL
DEVELOPMENT

Much of the law of conflicts of interest as it has developed in the
cases concerning off-reservation development and access to water
resources is simply inapplicable to conflicts over the development of
tribal resources. Use of the doctrines developed in those situations
would, for a number of reasons, unduly prejudice tribal interests and
subject tribal resource decisions to control by public interests. Most
important, the development of tribal minerals, unlike the development of
off-reservation resources or the general management of water resources,
is based on a full fiduciary relationship with the tribes. Because of that
full fiduciary relationship, the balancing approach of the off-reservation
192. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256-57.
193. Id. at 257.
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cases is inappropriate. The Secretary is obligated under the mineral
development scheme not to weigh tribal interests against public values,
but to act in the best interests of the mineral owning tribes. Moreover,
nothing in the mineral development scheme places dual obligations on
the government; nothing requires it to represent both tribal and
competing public interests in decisions concerning the mining of tribal
resources. Even to the extent that NEPA can be read as placing dual
obligations on the Secretary to consider both tribal and competing
environmental values, permitting non-tribal interests to block
development of tribal mineral resources would result in actual harm to
the tribes.
To a considerable degree, the existing law of administrative conflicts
is based on judicial findings that no full fiduciary duty exists between
the federal government and the affected tribes. In the off-reservation
development cases, the lack of any full fiduciary relationship was a
centerpiece of the courts' approach. None of the statutes governing
off-reservation federal activities created general enforceable duties to the
tribes. At most, the courts consistently held, the off-reservation statutes
created some sort of limited trust that obligated the federal government
to consider the impacts on the tribe as a separate concern in the federal
decisionmaking process. Similarly, in the water resources cases, courts
have generally rejected the notion that the federal government owes
tribes any full fiduciary duties with respect to tribal water rights.194 The
government may have some limited trust responsibilities, including the
obligation to represent tribes in litigation and the negative duty not to
interfere with the development of tribal water supplies, but it does not
have the full fiduciary relationship that would require the government to
put its obligations to the tribes above its obligations to off-reservation
water projects.195
In the case of mineral development, however, the government does
have a full fiduciary relationship with tribal mineral owners. The trust
obligation with respect to mineral development requires much more than
consideration of tribal interests or a negative duty not to interfere with
tribal development. It requires the government to act affirmatively in the
best interests of the tribes, particularly in the determination whether to
194. The exception was the Gila River situation, where the court found that the government had
undertaken a special relationship with respect to tribal irrigation water because the reservation was
created specifically to preserve the tribes' agricultural way of life. See supra notes 168-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 684 F.2d
852 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
195. The primary exception, discussed below, is the case of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). See generally text accompanying notes 186-93 (discussing
Pyramid Lake).
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approve a mineral agreement.1 9 6 The starting point of any analysis of
potential conflicting obligations surrounding mineral development, then,
must be the full fiduciary relationship created by the mineral
development statutes and regulations rather than the limited trust
relationship created by environmental statutes or the federal common
law of tribal water rights.
Accordingly, the balancing approach of the off-reservation conflicts
cases is inappropriate. That balancing approach is predicated on the fact
that the federal statutes governing off-reservation development of federal
resources create at most a limited governmental duty to the tribes. The
cases addressing tribal rights in off-reservation federal activities
generally require the federal government to give separate consideration
to tribal interests, but little more. Once the federal government has taken
a particularized look at the impacts on the affected tribes, it is permitted
to balance those impacts against the public interest. The full fiduciary
relationship created by the mineral development scheme, by contrast,
requires much more of the Secretary than a mere consideration of tribal
interests. The Secretary is specifically directed by Congress to act in the
best interests of the tribes, not merely to weigh those interests against
competing public values. When the federal government acts with respect
to tribal minerals, its obligation is thus not to reconcile competing
interests, but to act as a trustee for the benefit of the mineral owners.
For much the same reason, the "two shoulders" approach19 7 of the
water rights cases is also inapplicable.
In the case of mineral
development, Congress has not obligated the Secretary to represent both
tribes and competing public concerns. Instead, the mineral development
scheme provides that the Secretary's obligation is to the tribes. Congress
has directed the Secretary to act in the best interests of the mineral
owning tribes, not to represent conflicting concerns. The only possible
conflicting obligation mandated by Congress arises under NEPA. In the
preparation of an environmental impact statement for tribal resource
development, the Department of the Interior will necessarily consider the
environmental impacts on affected non-Indian lands and communities,
including nearby public lands represented by the Bureau of Land
Management. But the obligations imposed under NEPA are procedural.
Congress has mandated only that the Department take the requisite hard
196. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (1988).
197. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (noting that "Congress was requiring
the Secretary of the Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to him both the
responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects in
areas adjacent to reservation lands").
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look at the relevant environmental impacts, and not that Interior
"represent" in any substantive sense the environmental values of the
public.
Moreover, even to the extent that Congress has imposed dual
obligations on the Secretary under NEPA, the Secretary's denial of tribal
mineral development in order to appease non-Indian interests would
cause actual harm to the tribes. The 1982 Indian Mineral Development
Act was designed for two primary purposes: "to further the policy of
self-determination" and "to maximize the financial return" to the
tribes.198 The dual-obligations approach would result in actual harm to
both of those interests. First, the 1982 Act was intended to further tribal
self-determination by according tribes greater control over mineral
development. But that tribal control would be undermined by according
a virtual veto to competing public interests, resulting in actual harm to a
tribal interest specifically promoted by Congress. Second, mineral
development is a major source of economic development for
mineral-owning tribes. Not only do tribes receive revenues such as
bonuses, rents, and royalties, but tribes also may tax the non-Indian share
of production.1 99 Tribes also can bargain in the mineral agreements for
benefits such as job training and education, employment preferences,
tribal subcontracting, and the like. 2 0 0 If the Secretary denies
development of mineral resources, the impacts on tribal economies may
be severe. Based on these factors, the likelihood of actual harm to tribal
interests is substantial, and the Secretary. should thus be barred from
giving weight under NEPA to competing non-Indian claims.
If much of the law of administrative conflicts is inappropriate to
resolve the government's competing obligations to tribal mineral development and environmental protection of public lands, the approach
used in Pyramid Lake offers a resolution. 20 1 In that case, the court ruled
that the Secretary was obligated to resolve conflicting claims to water
consistent with the trust obligation to the tribe. Because the Secretary
failed to ensure that water not contractually obligated elsewhere was
delivered to the reservation for preservation of Pyramid Lake and its
fisheries, the court held that the Secretary had "fail[ed] to demonstrate

198. S. REP. No. 472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982). Similarly, the goals of the 1938 Indian
Mineral Leasing Act included assistance in achieving the Indian Reorganization Act purpose of
revitalizing tribal governments and promotion of tribal economic development by ensuring tribes the
greatest return on their minerals. S. REP. No. 985, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1937); H.R. REP. No.
1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-3 (1938).
199. See Royster, supra note 42, at 566-67, 586-87, 606-11.
200. Id. at 587-88.
201. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). See supra text
accompanying notes 186-93.
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an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe." 20 2 The
court specifically rejected the theory that the Secretary could make a
judgment call in an attempt to reconcile tribal and public interests in the
water. 20 3 A similar approach was taken in one of the few cases to
consider an on-reservation conflict of interest within the Interior
Department. In Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 204 an oil and
gas lessee discovered helium-bearing gas which the oil company had no
interest in producing. The company subsequently assigned its lease to
the Bureau of Mines, an agency within the Department of the Interior;
the tribe was not informed of the company's intent to surrender the lease
or of the assignment itself until after the assignment was effective. 20 5
The Bureau of Mines noted the wartime need for helium, and expressed
its desire to avoid "complications" that would arise if the tribe were
involved in the transaction. 206 The court held that the government had
violated its trust obligations to the tribe, obligations which were "even
greater" when the adverse party was an agency of the Department of the
Interior. 20 7 The court specifically found that the government's actions
violated the federal trust duty to the tribe, even though those actions may
have been in the national interest. 208
The only appropriate standard for administrative conflicts of
interest in mineral development is that suggested by Pyramid Lake and
Navajo Tribe. The government's primary obligation in the development
202. Id.at 257.
203. Id. at 256.
204. 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
205. Navajo Tribes of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320,323 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
206. Id. The assignment took place in December of 1942. Id.
207. Id. The court found the situation "somewhat analogous to that of a fiduciary who learns of
an opportunity, prevents the beneficiary from getting it, and seizes it for himself." Id. at 324.
208. Id. at 323-24. A similar situation arose over exploration for uranium on the Navajo
Reservation during World War 11. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227, 249 (1985).
In order to benefit national defense and the Manhattan Project, the federal government authorized the
survey and mapping of Navajo lands without informing the tribe, obtaining the consent of the tribe, or
compensating the tribe. Id. at 249-51. The court found that although the government's actions
arguably violated a private fiduciary's duty of loyalty, after Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983), the government was no longer held to private fiduciary standards in conflicts situations. 9 C1.
Ct. at 251-52. In the Navajo Tribe case, the court determined that the federal government was faced
with conflicting obligations to the tribe and to national defense, and was therefore not bound by a strict
duty of loyalty. Id. at 252. The court also, however, went out of its way to explain that the Navajo
Tribe had suffered no injury from the government's actions. The court concluded, in fact, that the
uranium exploration "equally promoted the purposes of the trust arrangement between plaintiff and
defendant regarding the leasing of lands for mining purposes." Id. at 253. In addition, the court found
that the tribe itself had recognized that the promotion of national defense interests "could serve
plaintiff's interests as well." Id. at 254. The case thus follows the pattern established in the offreservation conflicts cases, see supra part IV: where the federal action does not result in any actual
injury to the tribe, the government is entitled to balance the tribal interests against other public
concerns and to find that the national concerns outweigh the trust obligation to the tribe.
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of tribal mineral resources is to the tribes. That obligation, arising from
the full fiduciary relationship created by the mineral development
scheme, requires the government to put the interests of the tribes above
the public interest. The government may not engage in judgment calls
or in attempts to reconcile the conflicts between tribal and public
interests. In particular, where other interests represented by the
Department of the Interior are in conflict with tribal interests, the
Secretary must act scrupulously to protect the best interests of the
tribes .209
In any given instance, of course, bureaus such as Land Management
may have legitimate environmental concerns regarding the development
of tribal mineral resources. But the regulations governing mineral
agreements under the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act mandate
compliance with NEPA,210 which in turn mandates a hard look at the
environmental consequences of the proposed action. The Bureau of
Land Management or any other affected agency is entitled to participate
in the NEPA process and to comment on the draft EIS prepared by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Agencies representing interests in competition
with tribal interests thus have several opportunities to make their
environmental concerns known and to have those concerns addressed in
the EIS.
The information revealed by the EIS process is available to the
tribes before the decision to proceed with a mineral agreement is final.
Tribes thus take into account, in determining whether they wish to
develop their mineral resources, the environmental impacts on both the
tribal and neighboring non-tribal environment. If a tribe believes that the
environmental consequences of a proposed mineral agreement are too
serious, it can withdraw its initial consent. If a tribe believes that the
benefits of mineral development justify proceeding despite the known
environmental impacts, the agreement goes to the Secretary of the
Interior for approval.
As a preliminary step to approving any mineral agreement, the
Secretary must determine that the environmental consequences of the
agreement do not outweigh its expected benefits for the tribe.211 The
regulations thus specify precisely what the Secretary's obligation is: the
Secretary is to balance the environmental impacts on the tribe against the
economic and other benefits to the tribe. If the benefits outweigh the
environmental impacts on the tribe, the Secretary may approve the

209. See Navajo Tribe, 364 F.2d at 323.
210. 25 C.FR. § 225.24 (1994).
211. 25 C.FR. § 225.22(c)(2) (1994).
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proposed mineral agreement as in the best interests of the tribe. If the
Secretary also balances the interests of the tribe against the
environmental consequences to public lands, the Secretary may
potentially reject mineral development that is in the best interests of the
tribes on the ground of environmental impacts on non-Indian interests.
That balancing of tribal concerns against public interests, when the
governing statutes specify that the best interests of the tribes should
control the Secretary's decision, violates the federal fiduciary obligation
to the mineral owning tribes. The Secretary has no authority under the
statutes to subordinate the best interests of the tribes to public values or
the national interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
Development of tribal mineral resources creates the potential for
conflicts of interest within the Department of the Interior, pitting tribal
interests in development against environmental concerns for public lands
and resources. In most of the cases involving similar conflicts of interest,
the federal government is authorized to represent the dual interests and
to balance the tribal interests against competing public concerns, in
significant part because the situations do not impose full trust duties on
the government. The federal statutes and regulations governing mineral
development, however, create a full fiduciary relationship obligating the
Secretary of the Interior to act in the best interests of the tribes, and the
best interest determination requires full consideration of the
environmental impacts on the tribes as well as full compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act. Because environmental values are
fully considered in the determination whether mineral development is in
the best interests of the tribes, and because the Secretary's statutory
obligation is to the tribal interests, any further balancing of competing
concerns over environmental impacts on public lands would violate the
federal trust obligation to the tribes. In determining whether to approve
development of tribal mineral resources, the Secretary's obligation is to
the tribal mineral owners and not to a balancing of tribal and public
interests.

